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Abstract
In this paper, we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory
under complete information in a setting where coalitions are the fundamen-
tal behavioral units and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by
applying the solution concept of the core. The planners exercise consists of
designing a code of rights, which species the collection of coalitions that have
the right to block one outcome by moving to another. A code of individual
rights is a code of rights in which only unit coalitions may have blocking pow-
ers. We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for implementation (under
core equilibria) by codes of rights as well as by codes of individual rights. We
show that these two modes of implementation are not equivalent. This result
is proven robust and extends to alternative notions of core, such as that of an
externally stable core. Therefore, coalitions are shown to bring value added to
institutional design. The characterization results address the limitations that
restrict the relevance of existing implementation theory.
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1 Introduction
The challenge of implementation lies in designing a mechanism (i.e., game form)
where the equilibrium behavior of agents always coincides with the recommendations
given by a social choice rule (SCR). If such a mechanism exists, the SCR is said to
be implementable.
As such, the key question is how to design an implementing mechanism such
that its outcomes are predicted through the application of game theoretic solution
concepts. Most early studies on implementation focused on noncooperative solution
concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium and its renements. However, one of the
di¢ culties with this approach is that the canonical mechanisms are typically complex
and di¢ cult to explain in natural terms, as they rely on tail-chasing constructions,
such as the integer game.
As demonstrated in the seminal paper by Koray and Yildiz (2018) [henceforth
KY], an alternative to the noncooperative approach is to allow groups of agents to
coordinate their behaviors in a mutually benecial way. To move away from non-
cooperative modeling, the details of coalition formation are left unmodeled. Then,
coalitions not individuals become basic decision making units. Here, the role of
the solution concept is to explain why, when, and which coalition forms and what it
can achieve.
More importantly, the chosen coalitional solution concept is independent of the
physical structure under which coalition formation takes place (see, e.g., Chwe, 1994).
This structure, often dened by an e¤ectivity relationship, species which coalitions
are permitted to form given the status quo outcome and what they can achieve
when they form, that is, what new status quo outcomes they can induce. From the
implementation viewpoint, the e¤ectivity relationship is the design variable of the
planner and plays the role of mechanism.
KY formalize this idea and study its implications. In their framework, SCR im-
plementation is achieved by designing a generalization of the e¤ectivity relationship,
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introduced by Sertel (2001), called a rights structure.1 A rights structure   consists
of a state space S, an outcome function h that associates every state to an outcome,
and a code of rights . A code of rights species, for each pair of distinct states (s; t),
a collection of coalitions (s; t) e¤ective in moving from s to t. The rights structure is
more exible than the e¤ectivity function, as it allows strategic options of coalitions
to depend on how the status quo outcome is reached (i.e., on the current state).
As coalitional solution, KY adopt a version of the core, referred to as the   equilibrium.
A state s is an equilibrium state under a given rights structure and agentspreferences
if no e¤ective coalition can guarantee each of its members a utility level higher than
the one they receive under s. Then, the implementation problem consists of designing
a rights structure  , with the property that, for each prole of agentspreferences,
its equilibrium outcomes under those preferences coincide with the outcomes a given
SCR would select for that prole. If such a rights structure exists, the SCR is said to
be implementable by a rights structure.
The implications of KYs approach are interesting. Any SCR that is imple-
mentable by a rights structure can also be implemented by a rights structure in
which only unit coalitions have blocking powers, that is, an individual-based rights
structure, and vice versa. A counterintuitive implication of this result is that coali-
tion formation does not bring any value added to the implementation by the rights
structure. As such, for all purposes, it is su¢ cient to focus on unit coalitions alone.
The question is then why should institutions be designed based on coalition forma-
tion, as is often the case? For example, under a typical democratic constitution, a
bill can only be passed by consent from a majority of individuals.
Consequently, the scope of this paper is analyzing the insights of KYs study.
Specically, we generalize their characterization results, and our characterizations,
1McQuillin and Sugden (2011) have recently proposed a similar notion, named game in transition
function form, as a generalization of e¤ectivity functions.
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which are complete in each case, are easy to verify and provide comparative informa-
tion on the restrictiveness of di¤erent implementation modes. More importantly, our
conditions allow determining when and why coalitions matter under implementation
by right structures.
We rst provide a general characterization of the SCRs that are implementable by
rights structures. We show that (Maskin) monotonicity and unanimity, both being
restricted to a superset of the SCR image, are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
implementation.2 More importantly, this result does not make any domain assump-
tions and, hence, the result generalizes KYs characterization, which assumes a full
domain of preferences.
To answer the above question, we focus on the simple and natural restriction of
rights structures already introduced by KY. We take the set of outcomes as our state
space, that is, we assume that the implementation device is an e¤ectivity relationship
or, using the terminology of KY, a code of rights. Technically, we assume that outcome
function h is the identity map and the implementation exercise by rights structures is
reduced to the design of a code of rights , which species, for each pair of outcomes x
and y, a collection of e¤ective coalitions (x; y) that can induce y from x. Under this
framework, the equilibrium notion of KY is reduced to the familiar notion of core:
an outcome x is an equilibrium under a given code of rights and a given prole of
preferences if there is no coalition K that will nd it benecial to reject x and induce
an outcome that renders all members of K better o¤. Therefore, the implementation
problem consists of designing a code of rights  with the property that, for each prole
of agentspreferences, its equilibrium outcomes under those preferences coincide with
the outcomes a given SCR would select for that prole. If such a code of rights exists,
the SCR is said to be implementable by a code of rights.3
2Maskins monotonicity condition is known in the social choice literature under the name strong
positive association (e.g., Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977).
3Our approach is di¤erent from Peleg and Winters (2002), who use the notion of e¤ectivity by
Moulin and Peleg (1982) to appeal to the notion of implementation, where the game form not only
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Note that a code of rights captures the allocation of blocking powers in many real-
life situations in a natural way. In most democratic legislatures, bills are proposed
and amended under a process of deliberation until the nal version is adopted or
rejected by a majority of individuals (see, e.g., Ray and Vohra, 2014). This notion
has some theoretical advantages, as the power of a coalition in a code of rights does
not depend on how the state is reached but only what its physical implications are,
that is, what is the status quo outcome to become implemented. Arguably, this
type of distribution for coalitional power is rather in line with the standard approach
of coalition formation, which abstracts from the details of the coalition formation
process.
We demonstrate that the implementation by a code of rights is fundamentally de-
pendent on nonsingleton coalitions. To this end, we identify two necessary conditions
for implementability: one is the unanimity condition and the other we call strong
monotonicity, being stronger than (Maskin) monotonicity (see Section 5). These two
conditions are again di¤erent from the characterization of KY, which is only applica-
ble under a full domain of preferences. We prove that the two conditions are also
su¢ cient for implementation by codes of rights. More importantly, this full charac-
terization result is without restrictions over the preference domain.
We also study an implementation by codes of rights under which only unit coali-
tions can induce new outcomes. We call this type of codes of rights codes of individual
rights. Under this setting, we identify the necessary condition for implementability,
which we call singleton strong monotonicity. This condition is also su¢ cient when
combined with unanimity.
Singleton strong monotonicity implies strong monotonicity but, as we will demon-
strate, they are not equivalent. Therefore, the key insight for the implementation
implements an SCR under Nash equilibrium but also induces the same distribution of power as that
of the implemented SCR. See also Peleg et al. (2005). Moreover, Andjiga and Moulen (1988, 1989)s
analysis is a special case of ours, because in their model there is a simple game, rather than a code
of rights, that species coalitions that have the right to block one outcome by moving to another.
5
by rights structures that coalitions do not matter does not extend to the imple-
mentation by codes of rights. The underlying reason for this observation is that
implementation by an individual right structure requires a signicant amount of in-
formation concerning the preferences of the agent permitted to move at a particular
state. When the state space is coarsened, the needed information may no longer be
conveyed by the underlying state. Since the preferences of a coalition are less volatile
than those of an individual agent, coalitions may no longer be usefully replaceable
by individuals. An example is the majority solution, which is implementable by a
majority coalition-based code of rights but not by an individual-based one.
This conclusion is robust and can be extended to the implementation by codes of
rights for alternative core denitions. Indeed, we add to the notion of core the re-
quirement that blocking must be achievable through outcomes that are themselves in
the core, meaning we also consider implementation by codes of rights of what is often
referred to as an externally stable core. We call this type of implementation externally
stable implementation by codes of rights. This externally stable implementation is a
robust way of implementing outcomes, being more reliable than the implementation
of core outcomes, since external stability guarantees that no outcome outside the
core can be sustained. Moreover, an externally stable core is also more robust than
the Von NeumannMorgenstern (vNM) stable set or its derivatives, since it avoids
indirect internal stability problems (i.e., the Harsanyi critique; Harsanyi, 1974).
We provide a full characterization of this type of implementation by showing that
strong winner monotonicity a strengthening of the strong monotonicity unanimity,
and the no-simultaneous domination of F are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
implementation. Again, these conditions are di¤erent from those introduced by KY
in the context of externally stable implementation by a rights structure, which are
only applicable under a full domain assumption. Instead, our characterization does
not make any domain assumptions. More importantly, we show that an externally
stable implementation by codes of rights is not equivalent to an externally stable
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implementation by codes of individual rights, thus providing further motivation to
examine why coalitions should matter in implementation. A counterexample is the
majority solution.
2 Onmonotonicity conditions and tail-chasing con-
structions
The solution concept of this paper the core can be viewed as a generalization of
the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, as demonstrated by KY, every normal form game can
be formulated as a code of rights and its Nash equilibrium as the core associated with
the game. The same applies to strong Nash implementation, which also accounts
for coalitional deviations (i.e., monotonicity conditions for implementation in strong
Nash equilibrium are more stringent than those for Nash implementation; see Maskin,
1981; Korpela, 2013). Therefore, any (strongly) Nash implementable SCR is also
implementable via a code of rights. Still, the implication does not extend in the other
direction.
However, there are striking di¤erences between the two modes of implementation.
At the heart of the various characterization results concerning Nash implementa-
tion are monotonicity conditions, which compare the alternatives chosen by a given
SCR under pairs of preference proles. Generally, this is an easy task and makes
monotonicity an attractive condition to work with. Surprisingly, as shown by Maskin
(1999, working paper 1977), this type of monotonicity is also almost su¢ cient for
implementation with at least three agents, and monotonicity plus a condition of no
veto power is su¢ cient. However, this result, as well as the full characterization of
Moore and Repullo (1990), relies on the construction of mechanisms with unnatural
features. On one hand, their strategy spaces are complex and di¢ cult to interpret in
natural terms and, on the other, the construction relies on tail-chasing procedures to
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eliminate unwanted equilibria (see Jackson, 1992 and Abreu and Matsushima, 1992).4
The mechanisms used in this paper or those of KY do not rely on any tail-chasing
constructions. As the monotonicity condition that characterizes SCRs implementable
by rights structures is just a version of (Maskin) monotonicity, it is worth asking how
our canonical mechanism can eliminate unwanted equilibria. The reason lies within
the exibility of the rights structure. Unlike normal form games, where the strategy
space associated with a player is independent of the strategies chosen by other players,
a rights structure permits careful tailoring of the blocking coalitions for each state.
Therefore, in normal form games, the formation of a new equilibrium after a deviation
from untruthful reporting must be blocked by triggering a tail-chasing construction;
in the context of rights structure, this can be achieved by simply nding a blocking
coalition for the target state of the deviation. Thus, the additional degree of freedom
in the design of the rights structure can be used to block unwanted equilibria ex post,
that is, once the move has taken place. This implicit dynamic is a powerful tool
and also leads to a simpler characterization of implementable SCRs than comparable
ones in the context of Nash implementation (Moore and Repullo, 1990; Lombardi and
Yoshihara, 2013).
However, new questions on the exibility of rights structures and the embedded
dynamics emerge. Blocking by a coalition under an untruthful equilibrium will not
lead to a new one, since it is further blocked by another coalition. Hence, there
is no need to worry whether the blocking would lead to a new equilibrium state.
However, the question is where does the blocking process lead to? Further, can we be
sure that the end state of the process creates an e¤ective deterrence for the deviating
coalition? These questions, which form the scope of an expanding stream of literature
4One way to overcome these limitations is focusing on the implementation of specic SCRs, such
as the Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences (Hurwicz, 1979; Walker, 1981; Tian, 1989; Corchón
and Wilkie, 1996), as well as setting several desirable restrictions on mechanisms and identifying
the class of SCRs that are implementable by the mechanisms satisfying those restrictions (Jackson,
1992; Dutta et al., 1995; Saijo et al., 1996; Thomson, 2005).
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on farsighted coalition formation, do not have a clear answer in the current context.5
As pointed out by KY, implementation via rights structures is a myopic concept.
However, it is noteworthy that strengthening the solution concept makes the prob-
lem of farsightedness less pronounced. This can be clearly seen with reference to
implementation under externally stable solution concepts by a code of rights, under
which the mode of implementation is characterized by strong winner monotonicity
and unanimity. Indeed, the mechanism associated with this characterization result
allows deviations from any untruthful, non-desired equilibria so that they lead to a
desired equilibrium in one step. Hence, the solution is consistent with all behaviors
being farsighted. This is important because it implies that strong winner monotonic-
ity (along with unanimity) characterizes a mode of implementation free both from
tail-chasing procedures and myopicity. Furthermore, as the devised mechanism as-
sociated with the characterization of the class of SCRs that are externally stable
implementable by a code of rights is the same as that constructed for implementation
by a code of rights, the results also show that SCRs satisfying strong monotonicity
and unanimity can be implemented in a way that they are free from both criticisms.6
One benet of our characterizations is that the monotonicity conditions associ-
ated with the modes of implementation are progressively more stringent and directly
comparable when we move towards more demanding solution concepts. Moreover,
they make the comparisons between coalition- and individual-based solutions trans-
parent.
The remainder of this paper is divided into ve sections. Section 3 sets out the
theoretical framework and outlines the basic model. Section 4 revisits the implemen-
tation by rights structures. Section 5 provides a novel characterization of the class
of SCRs implementable via codes of rights, whereas Section 6 fully characterizes the
class of SCRs that are externally stable implementable by codes of rights. Section 7
5See, e.g., Chwe (1994), Vartiainen (2011), Vohra and Ray (2017), and Dutta and Vohra (2017).
6KY also show that their canonical mechanism is externally stable in the context of implemen-
tation by rights structure.
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concludes the paper.
3 Preliminaries
We consider a nite (nonempty) set of agents, denoted by N = f1;   ; ng, and a
(nonempty) set of outcomes, denoted by Z. For every set A, the power set of A is
denoted by A and A0  A  f?g is the set of all nonempty subsets of A. Each
element K of N0 is called a coalition. A preference ordering Ri is a complete and
transitive binary relation over Z. Each agent i(2 N) has a preference ordering Ri
over Z. The asymmetric part Pi of Ri is dened by xPiy if and only if xRiy and not
yRix, while the symmetric part Ii of Ri is dened by xIiy if and only if xRiy and
yRix. A preference prole is thus an n-tuple of preference orderings R  (Ri)i2N .
The preference domain, denoted by R, consists of the set of admissible preference
proles.
For R and K, we write xRKy for xRiy for all i 2 K and xPKy for xPiy for all
i 2 K.
The goal of the designer is to implement an SCR F , dened by F : R ! Z0. We
refer to x 2 F (R) as an F -optimal outcome at R. The range of F is the set
F (R)  fx 2 Zjx 2 F (R) for some R 2 Rg .
Following KY, to implement F , the designer designs a rights structure  , which
is a triplet (S; h; ), where S is the state space, h : S ! Z the outcome function,
and  a code of rights, which is a (possibly empty) correspondence  : S  S  N .
Subsequently, a code of rights species, for each pair of distinct states (s; t), a family
of coalitions  (s; t) entitled to approve a change from state s to t. A rights structure
  is said to be an individual-based rights structure if, for each pair of distinct states
(s; t),  (s; t) contains only unit coalitions if it is nonempty.
For any rights structure   and any preference prole R, a state s 2 S is an
equilibrium at R if, for no t 2 S   fsg, so that h (s) 6= h (t) and no K 2  (s; t) is
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h (t)PKh (s). We express C ( ; R) for the set of  -equilibria at R.
Denition 1 A rights structure   implements F if and only if F (R) = h C ( ; R)
for all R 2 R. If such a rights structure exists, F is implementable by a rights
structure.
Denition 2 F is implementable by an individual-based rights structure if there
exists an individual-based rights structure   so that   implements F .
KY show that the following monotonicity condition is necessary and su¢ cient for
an implementation by rights structures. We formalize the condition as follows. For
any preference ordering Ri and outcome x, the lower contour set of Ri at x is dened
by L (x;Ri) = fx0 2 ZjxRix0g. Therefore,
Denition 3 (Koray and Yildiz, 2018) F satises the condition of image monotonic-
ity provided that, for all x 2 Z and all R;R0 2 R, if x 2 F (R),
L(x;Ri)
\
F (R)  L(x;R0i) for all i 2 N ,
then x 2 F (R0).
A linear ordering of agent i, denoted by Pi, is a complete, transitive, and antisym-
metric binary relation over Z. We denote by PZ the collection of all proles of linear
orderings, that is, the unrestricted domain of linear orderings. Koray and Yildizs
(2018) equivalence result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Koray and Yildiz, 2018, p. 488) Let F : PZ ! Z0 be any SCR.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) F is implementable by a rights structure;
(ii) F satises the condition of image monotonicity;
(iii) F is implementable by an individual-based rights structure.
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4 Implementation by rights structures Full char-
acterization
We rst revisit implementation by rights structures. To this end, we propose two
conditions that are together necessary and su¢ cient for an SCR to be implemented
by a rights structure. The rst condition is the well-known (Maskin) monotonicity
(Maskin, 1999). This condition states that, if an outcome x is F -optimal at the prole
R and x does not strictly fall in the preference for anyone when the prole is changed
to R0, then x must remain an F -optimal outcome at R0. For subsequently presented
reasons, we dene below a stronger variant of the standard monotonicity condition.
Denition 4 F is (Maskin) monotonic w.r.t. W  Z provided that, for all x 2 W
and all R;R0 2 R, if x 2 F (R) and
L(x;Ri)
\
W  L(x;R0i)
\
W for all i 2 N ,
then x 2 F (R0).
It can be easily veried that image monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity
w.r.t. the range of F .
The second condition is a variant of the familiar unanimity condition, which states
that, if an outcome is at the top of the preferences of all agents, that outcome should
be selected by the SCR. This can be dened as follows.
Denition 5 F satises unanimity w.r.t. Y ( Z) provided that F (R)  Y and
that, for all x 2 Y and all R 2 R, if Y  L(x;Ri) for all i 2 N , then x 2 F (R).
The theorem below generalizes Theorem 1 by relaxing the preference domain as-
sumption. Indeed, our rst main result is that only SCRs that are monotonic w.r.t.
Y , as well as unanimous w.r.t. Y , are implementable by rights structures. More-
over, what can be implemented by a rights structure can also be implemented by an
individual-based rights structure, and vice versa.
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Theorem 2 Take any F . The following statements are equivalent:
(i) F is implementable by a rights structure;
(ii) F satises unanimity w.r.t. Y and monotonicity w.r.t. Y ;
(iii) F is implementable by an individual-based rights structure.
Proof.
(i) =) (ii)
Assume that   implements F . First, we show that F satises unanimity w.r.t.
Y . We dene Y as Y  fx 2 Zjx = h (s) for some s 2 Sg. From the denition of
Y , F (R)  Y . Take any x 2 Y and any R 2 R. Then, x = h (s) for some s 2 S.
Suppose that Y  L(x;Ri) for all i 2 N . Clearly, for no t 2 S fsg so that h (t) 6= x
and no K 2  (s; t) is h (t)PKh (s), and thus x 2 F (R), by implementability.
Next, we show that F is monotonic w.r.t. the above set Y . To this end, take any
R 2 R and x 2 Z so that x 2 F (R) = h  C ( ; R). Then, there exists s 2 S so
that h (s) = x. Moreover, for no t 2 S   fsg so that h (t) 6= x and no K 2  (s; t)
is h (t)PKh (s). Take any R0 2 R. Suppose that L(x;Ri) \ Y  L(x;R0i) \ Y for all
i 2 N . We then show that x 2 F (R0) = h  C ( ; R0). Assume, to the contrary, that
x =2 F (R0). Then, there exists t 2 S   fsg so that h (t) 6= x and K 2  (s; t) so that
h (t)P 0Kh (s). Since L(x;Ri) \ Y  L(x;R0i) \ Y for all i 2 K and h (t)P 0Kh (s), it
follows that h (t)PKh (s), which is a contradiction. Therefore, F is monotonic w.r.t.
Y .
(ii) =) (iii)
Assume F is monotonic and satises unanimity w.r.t. Y . We dene an individual-
based rights structure   = (S; h; ) as follows. First, we dene the set T as T 
f(x;R0) 2 Y Rjx 2 F (R0)g. Second, we dene the state space S by S = T [ Y .
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We dene the outcome function h : S ! Z as follows: h (x;R) = x for all (x;R) 2 T
and h (x) = x for all x 2 Y . Finally, we dene  : S  S  N as follows. For all
i 2 N ,
(a) For all ((x;R) ; (y;R0)) 2 T  T ,
fig 2  ((x;R) ; (y;R0)) () xRiy;
(b) For all ((x;R) ; y) 2 T  Y , fig 2  ((x;R) ; y) () xRiy;
(c) For all (x; (y;R0)) 2 Y  T , fig 2  (x; (y;R0));
(d) For all (x; y) 2 Y  Y , fig 2  (x; y).
We show that   implements F . To this end, x any R.
Taking any x 2 F (R), we show that x 2 h  C ( ; R). Since x 2 F (R), it
follows that (x;R) 2 T . We x any i 2 N and any (y;R0) or any y 2 S. From
part (a) of the denition of , we have fig 2  ((x;R) ; (y;R0)) if xRiy; otherwise,
fig =2  ((x;R) ; (y;R0)). Moreover, from part (b) of the denition of , we have
fig 2  ((x;R) ; y) if xRiy; otherwise, fig =2  ((x;R) ; y). Parts (c) and (d) of the
denition  never apply. Clearly, agent i is either not entitled to approve a change
from state (x;R) to state (y;R0) or state y, or does not have any incentives to do
so. Since the choice of i, as well that of states (y;R0) and y, is arbitrary, we have
x 2 h  C ( ; R).
Conversely, take any s 2 C ( ; R). We show that h(s) 2 F (R) : There are two
possible cases as follows.
Let s = x 2 Y and x any i. Since i is entitled to approve the change from state
x to any y 2 Y and since x 2 C ( ; R), it must be that xRiy. Since the choice of
y 2 Y is arbitrary, Y  L (x;Ri). Since the choice of i is arbitrary, it follows that
Y  L (x;Ri) for all i 2 N . Since F satises unanimity w.r.t. Y , x 2 F (R).
Let s = (x;R0) 2 T . It is obvious that only parts (a) and (b) of the denition
of  can apply. Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 F (R). Monotonicity implies that
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there exist i and y 2 L (x;R0i) so that yPix. Since y 2 L (x;R0i), it follows from
part (b) of the denition of  that fig 2  ((x;R0) ; y). However, since yPix and
fig 2  ((x;R0) ; y), we established that (x;R0) =2 C ( ; R), which is a contradiction.
(iii) =) (i)
Clearly, F is implementable by a rights structure if it is also implementable by an
individual-based rights structure.
Remark 1 When the preference domain is PZ , as in KY, Theorem 2 implies that the
range of any implementable F coincides with the set of outcomes Y because F satises
unanimity w.r.t. Y . Given that image monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity
w.r.t. Y = F (PZ), it follows that Theorem 2 is equivalent to Theorem 1 when the
preference domain is PZ .
5 Implementation via codes of rights
A natural candidate for the state space of a rights structure   is the set of outcomes
Z. Arguably, this captures the most natural way of allocating blocking powers in
real-life situations (see, e.g., Ray and Vohra, 2014). Therefore, by assuming that the
outcome function h, dened over Z, is the identity map, the implementation exercise
is reduced to the design of the code of rights  : Z  Z  N . For each pair of
outcomes x and y,  species a collection of coalitions  (x; y) that are e¤ective for
moving from x to y. If coalition K is an element of  (x; y) and if yPKx, we say that
x is blocked and K is a blocking coalition. If there is no such blocking coalition, we
say that x is unblocked. Here, we consider and analyze implementation exercises by
codes of rights, which we call implementation by codes of rights.
If we choose the set of outcomes Z as the state space of a rights structure   and
the identity function as the outcome function in the denition of  -equilibria, we
revert to the familiar notion of core, which can be dened as follows.
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Denition 6 For any  and any R, x is an equilibrium at R if for no y 6= x and no
K 2  (x; y) it is yPKx.
The blocking notion yields the concept of core at one preference prole R, which
is the set of all unblocked outcomes.7 Note that, in our denition of blocking, we
require that every member of the blocking coalition is strictly better o¤. For any
code of rights , we write C (;R) for the set of the equilibria at R.
Denition 7 A code of rights  implements F if and only if F (R) = C (;R) for all
R 2 R. If such a code of rights exists, then F is implementable by a code of rights.
One can easily verify that monotonicity w.r.t. Z is a necessary condition for
the implementation via codes of rights. However, one also can check that it is not
su¢ cient. We introduce below a new condition, called strong monotonicity using the
following additional notation. For any coalition K 2 N0, preference prole R 2 R,
and outcome x 2 Z, let
L (x;RK) 
[
i2K
L (x;Ri) ,
F 1 (x)  fR 2 Rjx 2 F (R)g ,
and
FK (x) 
\
R2F 1(x)
L (x;RK) .
We here present strong monotonicity from the viewpoint of necessity. To this
end, assume an SCR F is implementable by a code of rights . Taking an outcome
x 2 F (R) for some preference prole R 2 R, x must be an equilibrium at R. We x
any coalition K and denote by  (x;K) the set of outcomes for which coalition K is
e¤ective, that is,  (x;K)  fy 2 ZjK 2  (x; y)g. Since x is an equilibrium at R, it
follows that x is unblocked, that is, for every outcome y 6= x, if coalition K 2  (x; y)
is e¤ective in moving from x to y, then coalition K cannot be a blocking one. This
7Ray (1989) shows that the credibility of blocking coalitions is implicit in the denition of the
core.
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entails that y must be an element of L (x;RK) if y 2  (x;K). Since the choice of
outcome y 2  (x;K) is arbitrary, the set  (x;K) must be contained in L (x;RK).
For a canonical rights structure in which the set of states is S  f z; R jz 2 F   R
for some R 2 Rg, the designer can infer the lower contour set of Ri at x for member
i 2 K, that is, to infer the set L (x;RK).8 However, in a setting for which the state
space coincides with the set of outcomes, the designer cannot obtain information on
member is lower contour sets. Hence, the designer needs to consider any preference
prole R^ satisfying x 2 F

R^

. We choose such a preference prole R^. Then, the
preceding argument leads to the conclusion that the set of outcomes  (x;K) for which
coalition K is e¤ective must be contained in L

x; R^K

. This condition should be
satised for each admissible preference prole R^ satisfying x 2 F

R^

, that is, the
set  (x;K) must be contained in the intersection FK (x).
Therefore, if at some preference prole R0 the set L (x;R0K) contains 
F
K (x) and
thus the set of outcomes  (x;K) for which coalitionK is e¤ective, coalitionK cannot
be a blocking one. If this conclusion holds for all coalitions, x is unblocked, meaning
it is an equilibrium at R0. It follows that x must be F -optimal for this prole by
implementability. More formally, strong monotonicity can be stated as follows.9
Denition 8 F is strongly monotonic provided that, for all x 2 Z and all R;R0 2 R,
if x 2 F (R) and
FK (x)  L(x;R0K) for all K 2 N0,
then x 2 F (R0).
Note that strong monotonicity implies monotonicity (w.r.t. Z). Conversely, for
an example of a monotonic SCR that is not strongly monotonic, see the example
8See KY (proof of Proposition 1, p. 489).
9Our strong monotonicity condition must not be confused with the strong monotonicity condition
of Peleg and Winter (2002). The latter condition is now widely referred to as essential monotonicity
(Danilov, 1992).
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below.10
Example 1 (Walrasian solution) Assume three commodities and two agents. Let
Ui be the class of utility functions admissible for agent i, each assumed to be con-
tinuous, quasi-concave, and strictly monotonic. Let U  U1  U2 be the class of
proles of admissible utility functions and let UCD denote the class of proles of
Cobb-Douglas utility functions.11 Assume that UCD  U . Suppose agent 1s en-
dowment is e1 = (1; 2; 0) and agent 2s endowment e2 = (1; 0; 2). Let Z be the set
of all feasible allocations, that is, Z  f(x1; x2) jx1 + x2 = e1 + e2g. The Walrasian
solution, denoted by W , can be dened as follows. For each u 2 U and x 2 Z,
x 2 W (u) if and only if there is a price vector p 2  such that for all i 2 N ,
p  xi = p  ei and for all yi 2 R3+, if p  yi  p  xi, then ui (yi)  ui (xi),
where   p 2 R3+jP3`=1p` = 1	.12 Let us assume that, for all u 2 U and x 2 W (u),
it holds that xi` > 0 for all agents i and commodity `.13 Let u0 2 UCD be so that
u0i (x) = x
2
i1xi2xi3 for each agent i. Then, 1  (1; 1; 1) is a Walrasian allocation at
u0 and the Walrasian equilibrium prices are p0   1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4

. Let u1 2 UCD be so
that u1i (x) = xi1xi2xi3 for each agent i. Again, 1 is a Walrasian allocation at u
1
generated by p1   1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3

. It follows that u0; u1 2 W 1 (1). Finally, let u2 2 UCD
be so that u21 = u
0
1 and u
2
2 = u
1
2. W is not strongly monotonic since 1 2 W (u0),
WK (1)  L(1; u2K) for all K 2 N0 and yet 1 =2 W (u2). However, W is monotonic.
10It can also be shown that the (constrained) Walrasian solution violates strong monotonicity in
an exchange economy with more than three agents. The details are available upon request from the
authors.
11Although Cobb-Douglas utility functions are not strictly monotonic on the boundary of con-
sumption set R3+, only strict monotonicity on the interior of R3+ is necessary to obtain our result.
12p` denotes the price of commodity `.
13Under this assumption, the Walrasian solution coincides with the constrained Walrasian solution
(Hurwicz et al., 1995), which is known to be monotonic.
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As we formally show below, strong monotonicity is a necessary condition for im-
plementation via codes of rights, but it is not su¢ cient on its own for implementing
an SCR by a code of rights. The su¢ ciency is obtained by designing a code of rights.
The problem for the designer is how to allocate blocking powers when we start from
an equilibrium outcome x at R that does not belong to the range of F . We solve this
problem by making every agent i e¤ective in moving from x to y, for every feasible
y 2 Z. In other words, we allow the set of outcomes  (x; fig) for which agent i is
e¤ective to coincide with set Z. Given that x is an equilibrium at R, it must be that
x is a top outcome for agent i according to his/her preference ordering Ri. Then, to
make x an F -optimal outcome at R, we require the familiar condition of unanimity,
which states that, if an outcome is at the top of the preferences of all agents, then
that outcome should be selected by the SCR. The condition can be stated as follows.
Denition 9 F satises unanimity provided that, for all x 2 Z and all R 2 R, if
Z  L(x;Ri) for all i 2 N , then x 2 F (R).
We show that strong monotonicity and unanimity are necessary and su¢ cient for
an implementation by codes of rights.
Theorem 3 F is implementable by a code of rights if and only if F satises the
conditions of strong monotonicity and unanimity.
Proof. "Only If ": Assume that code of rights  implements F . Since it is obvious
that F satises unanimity, we show that F satises strong monotonicity. Take any
R and x so that x 2 F (R). Furthermore, take any R0 so that FK (x)  L(x;R0K) for
all K. We show that x 2 F (R0) = C (;R0).
Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 C (;R0). Then, there exist y 6= x and K 2
 (x; y) so that yP 0Kx. It follows that y =2 L(x;R0K). Take any R 2 F 1 (x). Since
x 2 C  ; R and since K 2  (x; y), it follows that y 2 L  x; RK. Since the choice
of R 2 F 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have y 2 FK (x). By our initial assumption that
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FK (x)  L(x;R0K), it follows that y 2 L(x;R0K), which is a contradiction. Therefore,
F is strongly monotonic.
"If ": Assume that F satises the conditions of strong monotonicity and unanim-
ity. Let us dene a code of rights  : Z  Z  N as follows. For all K,
(a) For all x 2 F (R) and all y 2 Z,
K 2  (x; y) () y 2 FK (x) ;
(b) For all x 2 Z   F (R) and all y 2 Z, K 2  (x; y).
We show that  implements F . Fix any R.
Let x 2 F (R). We show that x 2 C (;R). Since x 2 F (R), it follows that
x 2 F (R). Then, only part (a) of the denition of  applies. We x any K and y.
Assume that y 2 FK (x). Then, by the denition of , it follows that K 2  (x; y).
However, since y 2 FK (x), it also follows that y 2 L (x;RK). Moreover, by the
denition of , it holds that K =2  (x; y) if y =2 FK (x). Then, either K =2  (x; y) if
y =2 FK (x) or K 2  (x; y) and no yPKx if y 2 FK (x). Since the choices of K and y
are arbitrary, we conclude that x 2 C (;R).
Conversely, we take any x 2 C (;R). We proceed according to whether x 2 F (R)
or not.
Assume that x 2 Z   F (R). Then, only part (b) of the denition of  applies.
Fix any i. Since i 2  (x; y) for all y and x 2 C (;R), xRiy for all y, and so
Z  L (x;Ri). Since the choice of i is arbitrary, it follows that Z  L (x;Ri) for all
i. Since F satises the condition of unanimity, we have x 2 F (R).
Suppose that x 2 F (R). Then, F 1 (x) is not empty, meaning only part (a)
of the denition of  applies. Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 F (R). Then,
strong monotonicity implies that there exist K and y 2 FK (x) so that yPKx. Since
y 2 FK (x), K 2  (x; y) by denition of . Therefore, there exists y 6= x so that
yPKx, for some K 2  (x; y) and so x =2 C (;R), which is a contradiction.
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KY (p. 495) provide a characterization of the class of SCRs implementable via
codes of rights. This result is given in terms of monotonicity (w.r.t. Z), as well as of a
condition called binary consistency. The necessity for binary consistency relies on the
fact that they focus on the unrestricted domain of linear orderings, PZ. To introduce
this condition, we need the following additional notations. Take any P 2 PZ and any
a; b 2 Z. a is said to be not Pareto dominated by b at P if aPib for some agent i.
Take any P 2 PZ and any x; y 2 Z so that y is not Pareto dominated by x at P .
Let P xy be the prole obtained from P , in which x and y are the two most preferred
outcomes for all agents and, for all z 2 Z   fx; yg and i 2 N , it holds that xP xyz
and yP xyz; further, fi 2 N jyP xyxg = fi 2 N jyPxg.
Denition 10 F is binary consistent provided that, for all P 2 PZ and x 2 Z if for
all y 2 Z that are not Pareto dominated by x at P , it holds that x 2 F (P xy), then
x 2 F (P ).
Theorem 3 is logically equivalent to the characterization provided by KY. Unfor-
tunately, we were unable to nd a direct, intuitive bridge between the implementing
conditions in these theorems, although the formal arguments of their equivalence are
available from the authors upon request see the Addendum..
Although strong monotonicity is a demanding monotonicity-type condition, we
present below prominent SCRs that are implementable by a code of rights.
Example 2 (Pareto solution) The (weak) Pareto solution denoted by Po selects
all weak Pareto optima corresponding to a given prole R 2 R:
Po (R)  fx 2 Zjfor all y 2 Z   fxg there exists i 2 N such that xRiyg .
To verify that this solution satises strong monotonicity, assume that x 2 Po (R) for
some R. Moreover, suppose that, for some R0, it holds that PoK (x)  L(x;R0K) for
all K 2 N0. We show that x 2 Po (R0). Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 Po (R0).
Then, there exists outcome y 2 Z   fxg so that yP 0ix for every agent i 2 N , that
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is, y Pareto dominates x at R0. Now, we x coalition N 2 N0. Next, we take any
R 2 Po 1 (x) that is not empty, since x 2 Po (R). Since x 2 Po   R, it follows from
the denition of the Pareto solution that x Riy for some i 2 N . Since the choice of
R 2 Po 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have y 2 PoN (x). Since, by our initial assumption, it
holds that PoN (x)  L(x;R0N), it follows that y cannot Pareto dominate x at the
prole R0, which is a contradiction. Since the Pareto solution satises unanimity, it
follows that it is implementable by a code of rights.
Example 3 (Condorcet solution) The Condorcet solution denoted by CON se-
lects outcomes that are (weakly) majority preferred to any other outcome. Formally,
this solution can be dened as follows. For all P 2 P:
CON (P )  fx 2 Zjfor all y 2 Z : jfi 2 N jxPiygj  jfi 2 N jyPixgjg ,
where P is a (nonempty) set of proles of linear orderings for which the solution
is well-dened. This SCR is implementable by a code of rights. Clearly, it satises
the condition of unanimity. Then, we also show that it satises strong monotonic-
ity. To this end, let x 2 CON (P ) for some P 2 P. Moreover, we assume that,
for some prole P 0, it holds that CONK (x)  L(x; P 0K) for all K 2 N0. We show
that x 2 CON (P 0). To obtain a contradiction, let us assume that x =2 CON (P 0).
Then, there exists y so that jfi 2 N jyP 0ixgj > jfi 2 N jxP 0iygj. Let us denote by K
the set fi 2 N jyP 0ixg. Note that jfi 2 N jyP 0ixgj > n2 . Take any P 2 CON 1 (x),
which is not empty, since x 2 CON (P ). Since x 2 CON   P, it follows that x
is majority preferred to y at P , that is,
i 2 N jx Piy	  i 2 N jy Pix	. Since
jfi 2 N jyP 0ixgj > n2 , it follows that

i 2 N jx Piy
	\K is not empty. This implies that
y 2 L  x; PK. Since the choice of P 2 CON 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have y 2 CONK (x).
As by our initial assumption CONK (x)  L(x; P 0K), it thus follows that xP 0iy for some
i 2 K, which is a contradiction.
Example 4 (Individually rational solution) The individually rational solution,
denoted by Ir, with respect to some outcome a0 2 Z can be dened as follows: for
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all R 2 R,
Ir (R)  x 2 ZjxRia0 for all i 2 N	 .
This SCR is implementable by a code of rights. To determine it, observe that this
solution satises the condition of unanimity. To show that this solution is strongly
monotonic, assume that x 2 Ir (R) for some prole R 2 R. Furthermore, let us
assume that, for some prole R0, it holds that IrK (x)  L(x;R0K) for all K 2 N0. We
show that x 2 Ir (R0). Take any R 2 Ir 1 (x), which is not empty, since x 2 Ir (R).
Since x 2 Ir   R, it follows from the denition of Ir that x Ria0, for all i 2 N .
Since the choice of R 2 Ir 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have a0 2 Irfig (x) for all i 2 N . As
Irfig (x)  L(x;R0i) for all i holds according to our initial assumption, it follows that
xR0ia
0 for all i, and so Ir is strongly monotonic.
Example 5 (No-envy solution; Foley, 1967) Let the set of outcomes Z be Rn+.
The no-envy solution denoted by N can be dened for each R 2 R, by
N (R)  fx 2 ZjxiRixj for all i; j 2 Ng .
We assume that preference domain R consists of selsh preferences Ri, being dened
over R+. This solution is implementable by a code of rights. We omit the straightfor-
ward proof that N satises the condition of unanimity. Let us show that it is strongly
monotonic. To this end, let x 2 N (R) for some feasible R. Additionally, assume that,
for some feasible prole R0, it holds that NK (x)  L(x;R0K) for all K 2 N0. Assume,
to the contrary, that x =2 N (R0). Then, there exists an agent i who nds his/her as-
signment to be worse than the bundle assigned to agent j 6= i, that is, xjP 0ixi. Let us
denote by x a permutation of x so that xi = xj, x

j = xi and x

k = xk for every other
agent k 2 N  fi; jg. Then, by construction and the selshness of preferences, xP 0ix.
Next, take any R 2 N 1 (x), which is not empty, since, by our initial assumption,
x 2 N (R). Since x 2 N   R, it follows from the denition of N that xi Rixj, and so
x Rix
. Since the choice of R 2 N 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have x 2 Nfig (x). Since, by
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our initial assumption it holds that Nfig (x)  L(x;R0i), it follows that xR0ix, which
is a contradiction.
Application to matching problems: Implementation of the stable solution
A matching problem is a quadruplet (M;W;P;M) so that:
 M is a nite nonempty set of men with m as a typical element;
 W is a nite nonempty set of women with w as a typical element;
 P 2 P is a prole of linear orderings so that (i) every man m 2Ms preference
relation is represented by a linear ordering Pm over W [ fmg and (ii) every
woman w 2 Ws preference relation is represented by a linear ordering Pw over
M [ fwg.
 M is a collection of all matchings, with  as a typical element.  : M [W !
M [W is a bijective function, matching every agent i 2 M [W either to a
partner of the opposite sex or with himself/herself. If an agent i is matched
with himself/herself, we say that this i is single under .
We refer to (M;W;P ;M) as a class of matching problems, with (M;W;P;M) as
a typical matching problem. Note that Z =M and M [W = N .
To apply Theorem 3 to matching problems, we extend the linear ordering Pm of
a man m 2M to the preference ordering Rm onM as follows: for every ; 0 2M,
Rm ()
0 , either  (m)Pm ()0 (m) or  (m) = 0 (m) .
Similarly, this can be done for every woman w 2 W . Let R denote the preference
domain overM, obtained by a collection P of proles of linear orderings.
A matching  is blocked by agent i at R 2 R if iPi (i). A matching  is blocked
by a pair (m;w) 2 M W at R 2 R if mPw (w) and wPm (m). A matching  is
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stable at R 2 R if it is not blocked by any agent or any pair of a man and a woman
at R. Given a matching problem, the stable solution, denoted by St, can be dened,
for each R 2 R, by
St (R)  f 2Mj is stable at Rg .
Theorem 4 Let (M;W;P ;M) be any class of matching problems. The stable solu-
tion, St, dened over R, is implementable by a code of rights.
Proof. In light of Theorem 3, we need to show that St satises the conditions
of unanimity and strong monotonicity. We omit the straightforward proof that St
satises the condition of unanimity. Then, we need to show that this solution satises
strong monotonicity as well.
Take any two matching problems (M;W;P;M) and (M;W;P 0;M). Assume that
 2 St (R). Moreover, suppose that StK ()  L(;R0K) for all K 2 N0. We show
that  2 St (R0). To obtain a contradiction, we assume that  =2 St (R0).
Suppose that  is blocked by agent i at R0, that is, iP 0i (i). Then, ^ =2 L (;R0i)
for all ^ 2 M so that ^ (i) = i. Next, take any R 2 St 1 (), which exists since
 2 St (R). Since  2 St   R, it follows that  is not blocked by agent i at R, that
is, either  (i) Pii or  (i) = i. Then, for all ^ 2 M, if ^ (i) = i, then ^ 2 L
 
; Ri

.
Since the choice of R 2 St 1 () is arbitrary, we have ^ 2 Stfig () for all ^ 2 M
so that ^ (i) = i. As by our initial assumption, it holds that Stfig ()  L(;R0i), it
follows that R0i^ for ^ 2M so that ^ (i) = i, which is a contradiction.
Assume that  is blocked by a pair (m;w) 2M W at R0, that is, mP 0w (w) and
wP 0m (m). Then, ^ =2 L

;R0fm;wg

for all ^ 2M so that ^ (w) = m and ^ (m) = w.
Next, take any R 2 St 1 (), which exists since  2 St (R). Since  2 St   R, it
follows that  is not blocked by (m;w) at R, that is, not m Pw (w) or not w Pm (m).
For all ^ 2 M, if ^ (w) = m and ^ (m) = w, ^ 2 L  ; Rfm;wg. Since the choice of
R 2 St 1 () is arbitrary, we have ^ 2 Stfm;wg () for all ^ 2 M so that ^ (w) = m
and ^ (m) = w. As by our initial assumption, it holds that Stfm;wg ()  L(;R0fm;wg),
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it follows that R0w^ or R
0
m^ for ^ 2 M so that ^ (w) = m and ^ (m) = w, which
is a contradiction.
5.1 Implementation via codes of individual rights
A code of rights  is said to be a code of individual rights if, for each pair of distinct
outcomes x and y,  (x; y) contains only unit coalitions if it is not empty, that is, it
contains only coalitions of size one. Here, we study implementation exercises in which
the designer can devise only codes of individual rights, which we call implementation
by codes of individual rights.
Denition 11 F is implementable by a code of individual rights if there exists a
code of individual rights  so that  implements F .
Although strong monotonicity is still a necessary condition for implementation by
codes of individual rights, one can easily verify that it is not su¢ cient. We introduce
below a stronger variant of strong monotonicity, called singleton strong monotonicity,
which is shown to be necessary and su¢ cient for implementation by a code of individ-
ual rights when combined with the unanimity condition. To introduce this condition,
we need additional notation as follows. For any outcome x and agent i, let
Fi (x) 
\
R2F 1(x)
L (x;Ri) .
Therefore,
Denition 12 F is singleton strongly monotonic provided that, for all x 2 Z and
all R;R0 2 R, if x 2 F (R) and
Fi (x)  L(x;R0i) for all i 2 N ,
then x 2 F (R0).
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One can easily verify that the above condition is nothing more than the condition
of strong monotonicity restricted to unit coalitions. Roughly, the intuitions of the
two conditions are the same. The above condition appears in Saijo et al. (1996; p.
955) under the name Condition W . The theorem below characterizes the class of
SCRs implementable by codes of individual rights.
Theorem 5 F is implementable by a code of individual rights if and only if F
satises the conditions of singleton strong monotonicity and unanimity.
Proof. Let us dene a code of individual rights  : Z Z  N as follows. For all i,
(a) For all x 2 F (R) and all y 2 Z,
fig 2  (x; y) () y 2 Fi (x) ;
(b) For all x 2 Z   F (R) and all y 2 Z, fig 2  (x; y).
We omit the proof, which uses the above  to prove the "If " part of the statement
and similar arguments to the proof of Theorem 3.
The class of SCRs implementable by a code of individual rights is not empty. The
reason is that the individually rational solution and no-envy solution are singleton
strongly monotonic. Since the arguments respectively presented in examples 4 and 5
su¢ ce, we omit them here.
5.2 Non-equivalence
Coalition formation does not bring any value added to the implementation of core
equilibria by rights structures; for all purposes, it is su¢ cient to focus on unit coali-
tions. We now show that, once one focuses on the allocation of blocking powers
via the design of codes of rights, the implementation of core equilibria may require
non-singleton coalitions.
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By Theorems 3 and 5, it is not evident whether the class of SCRs implementable
via codes of rights is equal to that of SCRs implementable by codes of individual
rights. We nd they are not identical. An example is the Condorcet solution dened
in example 3. This result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 6 .
(i) Singleton strong monotonicity implies strong monotonicity.
(ii) Strong monotonicity does not imply singleton strong monotonicity.
Proof. The proof of part (i) is obvious and thus omitted. Let us now demonstrate
part (ii) by assuming that N  f1; 2; 3g and Z  fx; yg with x 6= y.14 Let PZ be the
set of all proles of linear orderings over Z. Moreover, let CON be the Condorcet
solution.
One can verify that there are four proles fP 0; P 3; P 2; P 1g  PZ at each x being
CON -optimal, since x is preferred to y by every agent at prole P 0 and by everyone
except agent j 2 N at prole P j. Similarly, let
n
P^ 0; P^ 3; P^ 2; P^ 1
o
 PZ be the proles
at which y is CON -optimal, since y is preferred to x by everyone at prole P^ 0 and
by everyone except agent j 2 N at prole P^ j. By example 3, we already know that
CON is strongly monotonic. To complete the proof, we need only to show that CON
violates singleton strong monotonicity. One can verify that
CONi (x) = fxg and CONi (y) = fyg , for all i 2 N .
Then, by construction, one can verify that, for each j = 0; 1; 2; 3 and i 2 N , it holds
that
CONi (x)  L
 
x; P ji

and CONi (x)  L

x; P^ ji

,
CONi (y)  L
 
y; P ji

and CONi (y)  L

y; P^ ji

.
14For simplicity, we prove the claim by assuming n = 3. The proof will be similar for n > 3.
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Now, to determine whetherCON violates the condition of singleton strong monotonic-
ity, it su¢ ces to observe that, for any j = 0; 1; 2; 3, we have x 2 CON (P j)  
CON

P^ j

but CONi (x)  L

x; P^ ji

for each i 2 N , in violation of singleton
strong monotonicity.
The example constructed to prove part (ii) of Theorem 6 can be used to show
that the Pareto solution is not singleton strongly monotonic.15 In light of Theorems
3 and 5, the main implication of Theorem 6 can be formally stated as follows.
Corollary 1 Implementation by codes of rights is not equivalent to implementation
by codes of individual rights.
6 Externally stable implementation by codes of
rights
We achieved the above results by focusing on the traditional notion of core, which has
been criticized for not being symmetric (Greenberg, 1990). Indeed, from its original
denition, an outcome x is not a core point if it is blocked, that is, if there is a
coalition that would reject x and move to another outcome y that would be preferred
by all its members. However, outcome y itself can, in turn, be blocked. Then, if we
require that an outcome be immune against blocking, symmetry would require that
the same should hold for y. That is, we should require that blocking be done through
outcomes that are themselves unblocked. This consistency requirement leads to the
concept widely referred to as an externally stable core.
Denition 13 For any code of rights  and any preference prole R, a set Z  Z
of outcomes is externally stable at R if, for all y 2 Z   Z, there is x 2 Z so that
xPKy for some K 2 (y; x).
15To this end, observe that x 2 Po  P 0, Poi (x) = fxg  Lx; P^ 0i  for each agent i but yet
x =2 Po

P^ 0

.
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Externally stable equilibria at R are denoted by EC(;R). The set of equilibria
in C(;R) is unique and, hence, EC(;R) is unique when it exists.
Here, we consider and analyze the implementation of an externally stable core by
codes of rights, which we call externally stable implementation by codes of rights.
Denition 14 A code of rights  externally stable implements F if F (R) = EC(;R)
for all R 2 R. If such a code of rights exists, F is externally stable implementable by
a code of rights. F is externally stable implementable by a code of individual rights
if there exists a code of individual rights  so that  externally stable implements F .
Externally stable implementation is a robust way of implementing optimal out-
comes, particularly being more reliable than implementation, since external stability
guarantees that no outcome outside the core can be sustained. An externally stable
core is also more robust than the vNM stable set or its derivatives, since it avoids
problems with indirect internal stability (i.e., the Harsanyi critique).
We propose two conditions that are together necessary and su¢ cient, when com-
bined with unanimity, for an SCR to be externally stable implemented by a code of
rights. The rst condition is a variant of strong monotonicity, called strong winner
monotonicity.
Denition 15 F is strongly winner monotonic provided that, for all x 2 Z and all
R;R0 2 R, if x 2 F (R) and
FK (x)
\
F (R0)  L(x;R0K) for all K 2 N0,
then x 2 F (R0).
In other words, this condition implies that, whenever x is F -optimal at one prole
R and for every coalition K, x is a maximal element in FK (x) \ F (R0) according to
the preferences of coalition K at R0K , it should be F -optimal at R
0. The intuition
is straightforward. Assume that x is F -optimal at R. Since the externally stable
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core at this R is a subset of the core at R, we know from Theorem 3 that whenever
preferences change from R to R0 and FK(x)  L(x;R0K) for each coalition K 2 N0,
x must remain F -optimal at new prole R0. However, by the requirement of external
stability, if x were not F -optimal at R0, there should exist a coalition K that can,
and wants to, reject x and move to an F -optimal outcome at R0. This means that it
is not the entire set FK(x) that matters to remove x as an equilibrium outcome when
preferences change from R to R0, but it is set FK(x)
T
F (R0) that matters.
The condition is stronger than strong monotonicity, since FK (x)\F (R0)  FK (x)
for all R0 2 R and K 2 N0. Conversely, for an example of a strongly monotonic (and
monotonic) SCR that is not strongly winner monotonic, see the example below.
Example 6 (Pareto solution with veto power) There are three players in N 
f1; 2; 3g, and two proles of linear orderings P and P 0 over set Z  fv; x; yg. Prefer-
ences are represented in the table below,
P P 0
1 2 3 1 2 3
x v x x v x
v x v y x v
y y y v y y
where, as usual, ab for agent i means that he/she strictly prefers a to b. Let F be so
that F (P ) = fv; xg and F (P 0) = fxg. F is not strongly winner monotonic, since
v 2 F (P ), FK (v) \ F (P 0)  L(v; P 0K) for all K 2 N0 and yet v =2 F (P 0). However,
one can verify that F is strongly monotonic (and thus monotonic).
The second condition can be stated as follows.
Denition 16 F satises the no-simultaneous domination of F provided that, for
all x 2 Z and all R 2 R, if x 2 Z   F (R), then for some i 2 N , yPix for some
y 2 F (R).
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The condition simply states that, if outcome x is not F -optimal at R, it cannot
be that this x dominates every outcome in the range of F at R in the sense that x
is at least as good as every F -optimal outcome at R for every agent i 2 N . When
preference domain R is the domain of linear orderings, the condition implies that
an outcome x that is not F -optimal at R cannot Pareto dominate every F -optimal
outcome at R.16
Our next result is that the class of SCRs externally stable implementable by codes
of rights coincides with the class of SCRs that satisfy strong winner monotonicity,
unanimity, and no-simultaneous domination of F .
Theorem 7 F is externally stable implementable by a code of rights if and only
if F satises the conditions of strong winner monotonicity, unanimity, and no-
simultaneous domination of F .
Proof. "Only If ": Assume that  externally stable implements F . SinceEC (;R0) 
C (;R0) for every R0 2 R, it is obvious that F satises unanimity and the no-
simultaneous domination of F . Then, we only show that F satises strong win-
ner monotonicity. Take any R and x so that x 2 F (R). Take any R0 so that
FK (x) \ F (R0)  L(x;R0K) for all K 2 N0. We show that x 2 F (R0). Assume,
to the contrary, that x =2 F (R0) = EC (;R0). Then, there exist y 2 EC (;R0)
and K 2  (x; y) so that yP 0Kx. Considering implementability, y 2 F (R0). Take any
R 2 F 1 (x). Since x 2 EC  ; R and K 2  (x; y), it follows that y 2 L  x; RK;
otherwise, x =2 C   ; R, which is a contradiction. Since the choice of R 2 F 1 (x)
is arbitrary, we have y 2 FK (x). By our initial assumption that FK (x) \ F (R0) 
L(x;R0K), it follows that y 2 L(x;R0K), which is a contradiction. Therefore, F is
strongly winner monotonic.
"If ": Assume that F satises strong winner monotonicity, unanimity, and no-
simultaneous domination of F . Let us dene  : Z  Z  N as in the proof of
Theorem 3. We show that  externally stable implements F . We x any R.
16For any prole R, we say that outcome x Pareto dominates y if xPiy for all i 2 N .
32
Since strong winner monotonicity implies strong monotonicity, Theorem 3 im-
plies that F (R) = C (;R). We complete the proof by showing that C (;R) is an
externally stable set.
Conversely, assume that C (;R) is not externally stable. Then, there exists
y 2 Z   C (;R) so that, for all x 2 C (;R), it holds that yRKx or K =2  (y; x) for
all K. We x one of outcomes y. We now proceed according to whether y 2 F (R)
or not.
Case 1 : y 2 F (R)
Then, y 2 F (R0) for some R0. Since y =2 F (R) = C (;R), strong winner
monotonicity implies that there exist K and x so that x 2 FK (y)\F (R) and xPKy.
Since x 2 FK (y), it follows that K 2  (y; x) from part (a) of the denition of .
Then, there is an outcome x 2 C (;R) so that xPKy for some K 2  (y; x), which is
a contradiction.
Case 2 : y =2 F (R)
Then, y 2 Z F (R). Further, from part (b) of the denition of , K 2  (y; x) for
all x 2 F (R) and all K. Since C (;R) is not externally stable and y 2 Z  C (;R),
it follows that yRKx for all K, meaning y simultaneously dominates the range of F ,
which is a contradiction.
One may wonder whether the non-equivalence result of Corollary 1 extends to this
notion of equilibrium. The answer is yes. To this end, we dene below a variant of
strong winner monotonicity, which we call singleton strong winner monotonicity.
Denition 17 F is singleton strongly winner monotonic provided that, for all x 2 Z
and all R;R0 2 R, if x 2 F (R) and
Fi (x)
\
F (R0)  L(x;R0i) for all i 2 N ,
then x 2 F (R0).
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One can easily verify that singleton strong winner monotonicity is necessary for
the externally stable implementation by a code of individual rights. Additionally, this
condition is su¢ cient for the externally stable implementation by a code of individual
rights when combined with unanimity and the no-simultaneous domination of F .
Indeed, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8 F is externally stable implementable by a code of individual rights
if and only if it satises the conditions of singleton strong winner monotonicity,
unanimity, and no-simultaneous domination of F .
Proof. Consider the code of individual rights  in the proof of Theorem 5. Since the
proof readily follows from arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem
7, we omit it here.
The fact that the externally stable implementation by codes of rights is not equiv-
alent to that by codes of individual rights readily follows from the facts that single-
ton strong winner monotonicity implies singleton strong monotonicity, the Condorcet
solution is externally stable implementable when the number of voters is odd (see
example 8 below), and the Condorcet solution is not singleton strongly monotonic
from the proof of part (b) of Theorem 6.
Corollary 2 Externally stable implementation by codes of rights is not equivalent
to externally stable implementation by codes of individual rights.
Finally, the following examples show that the class of SCRs externally stable
implementable by a code of rights is not empty. The formal denitions of the SCRs
below have been given in Section 5.
Example 7 The Pareto solution, Po, is externally stable implementable. Since it
is straightforward to verify that Po satises no-simultaneous domination of F and
unanimity, we omit the proofs here. To check whether Po is strong winner monotonic,
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assume that x 2 Po (R) for some R. Moreover, assume that, for some R0, it holds that
PoK (x) \ Po (R0)  L(x;R0K) for all K 2 N0. We show that x 2 Po (R0). Assume,
to the contrary, that x =2 Po (R0). Then, there exists an outcome y 2 Z   fxg so
that y Pareto dominates x at R0. We x coalition N 2 N0. Take any R 2 Po 1 (x),
which is not empty, since x 2 Po (R). Assume that z =2 L  x; RN for some z 2
Po (R0). Then, z Pareto dominates x at R, which is a contradiction. This means
that Po (R0)  L  x; RN. Since the choice of R 2 Po 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have
Po (R0)  PoN (x). Finally, take any R 2 Po 1 (x). Then, x Riy for some i 2 N .
Since the choice of R 2 Po 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have y 2 PoN (x). Since, by the
above discussion, it holds that PoN (x)  L(x;R0N), it follows that y cannot Pareto
dominate x at R0, which is a contradiction.
Example 8 The Condorcet solution, CON , is externally stable implementable. Let
us allow the cardinality of voters, n, to range over all odd natural numbers. One
can easily verify that this solution satises the conditions of unanimity and no-
simultaneous domination of F . To check whether it also satises strong winner
monotonicity, assume that x 2 CON (P ) for some P 2 P.17 Moreover, assume
that, for some prole P 0, it holds that CONK (x) \ CON (P 0)  L(x; P 0K) for all
K 2 N0. We show that x 2 CON (P 0). Take any coalition K whose cardinality
is not lower than n+1
2
. Take any y 2 CON (P 0). Let us show that y 2 CONK (x).
To this end, take any P 2 CON 1 (x). Since x 2 CON   P, it follows that there
is a voter i 2 K so that x Piy, and so y 2 L
 
x; PK

. Since the choice of P is
arbitrary, as is that of outcome y, it follows that CON (P 0)  CONK (x). Next, as-
sume, to the contrary, that x =2 CON (P 0). Therefore, there exists y 2 CON (P 0)
so that jfi 2 N jyP 0ixgj > jfi 2 N jxP 0iygj. Let K  fi 2 N jyP 0ixg and note that
its cardinality is at least n+1
2
. Thus, y =2 L (x; P 0K). However, since we know that
CON (P 0)  CONK (x)  L (x; P 0K), it follows that y 2 L (x; P 0K), which is a contra-
17Recall that P is a (nonempty) set of proles of linear orderings, for which the solution is well-
dened.
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diction.
Example 9 The individually rational solution, Ir, is externally stable implementable.
Clearly, Ir satises the conditions of unanimity and no-simultaneous domination of
F . To determine whether this solution is also strongly winner monotonic, assume
that x 2 Ir (R) for some prole R 2 R. Furthermore, let us assume that, for some
prole R0, it holds that IrK (x) \ Ir (R0)  L(x;R0K) for all K 2 N0. We show that
x 2 Ir (R0). By the same arguments used in example 4, we know that a0 2 Irfig (x)
for all i 2 N . Moreover, from the denition of Ir, it also holds that a0 2 Ir (R0).
Since, by our initial assumption, it holds that Irfig (x) \ Ir (R0)  L(x;R0i) for all
i 2 N , it follows that xR0ia0 for all i 2 N , meaning Ir is strongly winner monotonic.18
7 Concluding remarks
Since the seminal contribution of Maskin (1999), economists have been interested
in understanding how to circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonic-
ity by exploring the possibilities o¤ered by approximate (as opposed to exact) im-
plementation (Abreu and Matsushima, 1992; Abreu and Sen, 1991), as well as by
implementation under the renements of Nash equilibria (Moore and Repullo, 1988;
Abreu and Sen, 1990; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson, 1992; Vartiainen, 2007)
and repeated implementation (Kalai and Ledyard, 1998; Lee and Sabourian, 2011;
Mezzetti and Renou, 2017).
Coalitional implementation does not quite t any of these literature strands, as
the coalitional approach relies on a certain degree of coordination by agents within
a coalition. The theory is thus silent on how this will take place but assumes it will
when the conditions for cooperation are appropriate. Due to this abstraction from
18Since the same arguments also show that the individually rational solution is externally stable
implementable by a code of individual rights, it follows that the class of SCRs characterized by
Theorem 8 is not empty.
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the details of interaction, a powerful mode of implementation becomes feasible.
We provide a full characterization of the class of SCRs implementable by codes
of rights, as well as of the class of SCRs implementable by codes of individual rights.
In contrast to implementation by rights structures, the specialization of the state
space in the set of outcomes has a rather intuitive implication, as we prove that, to
implement an SCR by a code of rights, blocking powers need to be allocated to non-
singleton coalitions. This is the case if we want to implement the Pareto or Condorcet
solutions, for example. We have also shown that this insight is robust and extends to
the implementation by codes of rights for alternative denitions of the core, such as
an externally stable core.
A persistent criticism of the theory of implementation is that the mechanisms used
in the constructive proofs have unnatural features (Abreu and Matsushima, 1992;
Jackson, 1992, 2001). The reason is that the devised mechanisms rely on tail-chasing
constructions such as the integer or modulo games to ensure that undesired strategy
combinations do not form an equilibrium. KY have shown that implementation by
rights structures, as well as by codes of rights, do not su¤er from this criticism.
They have achieved this important result by focusing on the unrestricted domain
of linear orderings, for which the class of (Maskin) monotonic SCRs is smalland
the implementing mechanisms are relatively simpler (Saijo, 1987; Dasgupta et al.,
1979; Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). However, it remains unclear whether this
important result generalizes to other preference domains or hinges upon their domain
assumption. In this regard, the characterization results presented in this paper remove
any doubt, by showing that the result generalizes to any type of preference domain,
even preference domains admitting indi¤erence.
We believe that the implementation framework in this paper is simple and in-
tuitively appealing, and may thus have an important bearing on mechanism design.
The developed methodology is thus likely to prove useful in the important task of an-
alyzing environments, where agents have incomplete information, particularly on the
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preferences of the other agents they are facing, as well as on incorporating elements
of farsightedness. Therefore, this is a fruitful area for future research.
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Addendum: not for publication
Theorem 9 Take any SCR F dened on PZ. Then, F is monotonic (w.r.t. Z) and
binary consistent if and only if F satises strong monotonicity and unanimity.
Proof. "Only If ": Suppose that F , dened over PZ , is monotonic and binary con-
sistent.
Fix any P 2 PZ . Suppose that Z  L (x;Ri) for all i 2 N . Assume, to the
contrary, that x =2 F (P ). Binary consistency implies that there exists y 2 Z, not
Pareto dominated by x at P , such that x =2 F (P xy), which contradicts our supposition
Z  L (x;Ri) for all i 2 N . Thus, F satises unanimity.
Let x 2 F (P ) for some P 2 PZ . Moreover, assume that for some prole P 2 PZ ,
it holds that FK (x)  L(x; PK) for all K 2 N0. We show that x 2 F
 
P

. To obtain
a contradiction, let us suppose that x =2 F   P. Binary consistency implies that there
exists y 2 Z, not Pareto dominated by x at P , such that x =2 F   P xy. Dene the
set K =

i 2 N jy Pix
	
, which is not empty by binary consistency. Also, note that
y =2 L(x; PK), by construction.
Now, take any prole of linear orderings ~P such that
n
i 2 N jy ~Pix
o
= K. Suppose
that x 2 F

~P

. Then, by construction of the prole P x;y, it follows that K =
ijy P xyx	. Moreover, x P xyz for all z 2 Z   fx; yg, for all i 2 N . Then, since
L

x; ~Pi

 L  x; P xyi  for all i 2 N , monotonicity implies that x 2 F   P xy, which
is a contradiction. We conclude that for every ~P 2 PZ , if
n
i 2 N jy ~Pix
o
= K, then
x =2 F

~P

.
Take any ~P 2 F 1 (x), which is not empty since x 2 F (P ), by our initial sup-
position. Since x 2 F

~P

, it follows that
n
i 2 N jy ~Pix
o
6= K. This implies that
there exists an agent i 2 K such that x ~Piy, and so y 2 L

x; ~PK

. Since the choice of
~P 2 F 1 (x) is arbitrary, it follows that y 2 FK (x). Since by our initial supposition it
holds that FK (x)  L(x; PK), it follows that y 2 L(x; PK), which is a contradiction.
"If ": Suppose that F , dened over PZ , satises strong monotonic and unanimity.
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Since it is straightforward to verify that F is monotonic, we omit its proof here. Let
us show that F is binary consistent. Fix any P 2 PZ and any x 2 Z. Suppose
that for each y 2 Z that is not Pareto dominated by x at P , it holds that x 2
F (P xy). We show that x 2 F (P ). Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 F (P ).
Unanimity implies that y cannot be Pareto dominated by x at P . Then, by our initial
supposition, x 2 F (P xy). Strong monotonicity implies that there exist y 2 FK (x)
and K 2 N0 such that yPKx. By construction of the prole P xy, it follows that
K  fi 2 N jyP xyi xg = fi 2 N jyPixg. Next, take any ~P 2 F 1 (x). Since y 2 FK (x),
it follows that y 2 L

x; ~PK

. Since the choice of ~P 2 F 1 (x) is arbitrary, it follows
from x 2 F (P xy) that y 2 L (x; P xyK ), which is a contradiction.
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